In addition, the FASB discusses four criteria for when control has been transferred to the buyer. FASB indicates that control passes if "(a) the reason for the bill-and-hold is substantive; (b) the product is separately identified as belonging to the customer; (c) the product is ready for physical transfer; and (d) the entity [seller] cannot use the product or sell it to another customer" (FASB, 2011, p. 53). Contractual agreements, such as these, can cause multiple complexities in the revenue recognition process.
In contrast to "point-of-sale" transactions, GAAP also allows for revenue to be recognized prior to delivery via the percentage-of-completion method. This method is typically applicable to long-term construction projects, but can be applied in other instances. Under this approach, the "seller" will record revenue, gross profit, and costs in multiple accounting periods. The value of the revenue, earnings, and costs will be based on the percentage of the project completed during that particular stage. In order to compute the percentage complete, the "seller" would need to divide cumulative costs, since the inception of the project, by the estimate of total construction costs (Kieso, Weygandt, & Warfield, p. 1083). As U.S. GAAP is grounded on the matching principle (which mandates that revenue must be matched with expenses incurred during the same accounting period), it is important for revenue to be recorded periodically throughout the tenure of the long-duration project. Thus, the percentage-of-completion method is used to allocate earnings to the accounting periods when earned. If this rule did not exist and a five-year construction project took place, the seller would not be able to report any revenue until the fifth year. This would create the illusion that the company had little revenue during the first four years, but had substantial revenue and earnings in the last year of the project. In this instance, stakeholders would not be provided with timely information, and thus, the usefulness of the financial statements would be severely diminished.
Though there is an array of approaches available for U.S. public corporations to recognize revenue, businesses must understand that a particular rule can only be applied when the proper conditions exist. An overview of various revenue recognition policies is displayed in Table 1 . Nonetheless, in recent years, there have been numerous cases of entities misapplying U.S. revenue recognition rules. In the subsequent section, the authors will present examples of corporations accused of defying the law.
Examples of Corporate Revenue Misstatements
Nearly all industries have faced scandals for the inaccurate reporting of financial results. Industries affected include, but are not limited to the consulting, technology, financial service, media, medical, energy, food & beverage, retail, and manufacturing sectors. According to Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement, "Overly aggressive accounting can distort a company's true financial condition and mislead investors" (SEC, 2009, August 4). As a result of total SEC enforcement actions, the agency collected over "$5.9 billion in disgorgement and penalties during fiscal years 2011 and 2012...for the benefit of harmed shareholders" (SEC, 2012, November 14). Total enforcement actions included penalties for "financial crisis-related cases, insider trading cases, issuer and disclosure violations, infringements of the Foreign Corrupts Practices Act of 1977, and actions against investment advisers and broker dealers" (SEC, 2012, November). Revenue recognition violation cases are included within the "issuer and disclosure violations" section.
Nonetheless, while the abovementioned industries have been impacted by various scandals, the focus of this paper is on revenue recognition-related issues. Figure 1 
Technology: Hewlett Packard (HP)
The first case of revenue deception involves the technology behemoth, Hewlett Packard (HP). HP, the manufacturer of computer hardware, was subject to an accounting scandal resulting from the purchase of a U.K.-based software manufacturer -Autonomy. The acquisition was completed in October 2011 at a purchase price of $11.1 billion, or £25.50 per share. This value represented a 76% premium over the trading price at the time of the announcement (Haddon, 2011) . Although HP's intentions to boost profitability and enhance stockholder wealth were sensible, the diversification into the software market, via the acquisition, created major troubles for the entity. Within one year after the acquisition, HP alleged that there were significant accounting anomalies at the subsidiary (HP, 2012 Annual Report, p. 32). Via an internal investigation, HP claimed that some of the Autonomy's employees intentionally misled investors by "inflating the [company's] underlying financial metrics" (Worthen, 2012, November 27 ).
HP's allegations against Autonomy were multifold. The company was accused of falsely booking hardware sales as software sales in order to artificially improve profits. Typically, software sales yield higher profit margins versus hardware sales. In addition, the subsidiary purportedly sold hardware to "value added resellers," who acted as intermediaries between the customers and Autonomy. However, these "sales" typically did not translate into a true customer purchase. Nonetheless, the company booked these sales as licenses. Finally, HP claims that the subsidiary booked revenue from long-term software subscriptions immediately instead of deferring revenue recognition, as required by GAAP (Hesseldahl, 2012, November 20) .
As a result of HP's findings of significant "accounting improprieties, misrepresentations, and disclosure failures," the technology giant was forced to record a $5 billion write-down -or approximately 45% of the acquisition price -during the fourth quarter of 2012. In total, HP took a charge of $8.8 billion from the deal (Worthen, 2012, November 27) . The full loss was comprised of a write-down of both goodwill and an intangible asset impairment charge (HP, 2012 Annual Report, p. 32). Goodwill, which is an asset, is created only when an acquiring company pays more than the fair market value of net identifiable assets of the acquire. This asset can be impaired if the perceived value of the acquiree deteriorates.
The above losses were also partially based on a retroactive revision to the subsidiary's revenues and earnings using the "correct" measurements. However, Autonomy's founder, Mr. Michael Lynch, claims that any accounting discrepancies are due to key differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS and that HP was aware of these differences (Worthen, 2012, December) . Table 2 is an overview of how U.S. GAAP and IFRS diverge with regard to software revenue recognition. As presented in the above table, GAAP requires additional evidence from a software sale or license to be booked when compared to IFRS. According to the accounting firm, Grant Thorton, "Revenue Recognition for software vendors can be complicated" (Davies, 2012) . This complexity occurs because software is generally packaged with other products, such as a personal computer. Autonomy asserts that HP has no fundamental claim against the subsidiary's practices with value-added resellers either because, under IFRS, "revenue can be recognized if sales are delivered in the current period, there is no right of return, collection is probable, and the fee is fixed or determinable" (Davies, 2012) . In addition, the revenue recognition process for licenses may appear to be legal under IFRS as fair value estimates are permitted. Consequently, due to the fraud allegations, nine lawsuits have been launched by shareholder groups against HP (HP, 2012 Annual Report, pp. 157-159). In May 2013, a billion dollar class action lawsuit was also filed by shareholders. The charge suggests that HP was aware of the accounting issues at Autonomy but did not disclose this fact to the public. Accordingly, when the issues at Autonomy were fully disclosed in November 2012, HP's stock lost over $3.4 billion in market capitalization in a single day (Gardside, 2013) . Thus, the lawsuit intends to recover some of this lost capital.
Nonetheless, HP's CEO, Meg Whittman, indicated that Autonomy will remain a key component of the company's future success and that HP has no plans to divest the unit (Leach, 2013). Although the colossal losses adversely impacted shareholder wealth after the negative information became public, the parent company appears convinced that the acquisition will provide long-term revenue and profitability improvement.
Technology -Nortel, Inc.
In continuation with the technology sector, Nortel, the former multinational telecommunications and data networking equipment manufacturer, was also accused of artificially boosting its financial performance. Although Nortel is a Canadian corporation, the company began using GAAP in January 2000 as its common stock traded in the U.S. Foreign public companies can choose to list their stock on U.S. stock exchanges as an American Depository Receipt (ADR). According to the SEC, although Nortel initially adopted bill-and-hold accounting, the company banished its use as the recognition process was rendered complex. Yet, as Nortel's sales began to negatively diverge from analyst expectations, management chose to resurrect the accounting method. However, the company allegedly violated GAAP by adopting its own criteria to record sales. Nortel purportedly approached clients and encouraged them to engage in bill-and-hold transactions. This tactic is illegal under U.S. GAAP (SEC, Nortel Court Complaint, 2007, pp. [17] [18] .
In addition, the SEC asserted that Nortel created earnings reserves and did not follow GAAP's reserve disbursement requirements. Instead, the executives allegedly used the reserves to manipulate earnings to boost profitability in quarters where losses truly resulted, as was the case in the first quarter of 2003. Thus, management touted that the company had returned to profitability ahead of schedule and thus used this event to distribute bonuses (SEC, 2007, October).
Regardless of Nortel's attempted accounting maneuvers, the tactics did not result in long-term profitability. Partly as a result of the harsh financial conditions during the financial crisis, the company filed for bankruptcy in 2009. As of early 2013, Nortel has divested all assets and the stock is rendered worthless (Nortel Networks, 2013).
Media -TheStreet, Inc.
Although the technology sector contained some of the largest revenue recognition cases, the media sector has also been impacted. In December 2012, TheStreet, Inc., a New York based internet financial news company, was charged by the SEC for committing accounting fraud (Gandel, 2012) . In contrast to the Nortel example, TheStreet actually detected its own accounting irregularities and reported these findings. The SEC complaint argued that TheStreet had "filed false financial reports by reporting revenue from fraudulent transactions at a subsidiary it had acquired the previous year" (SEC, 2012, December 18). The charge was also extended to the company's former CFO, Eric Ashman, as well as the co-presidents of the acquired subsidiary, Gregg Alwine and David Barnett (Ryan, 2012) . Specifically, TheStreet's former CFO, Eric Ashman, was accused of allowing for "revenue to be reported before it was earned," which clearly violates GAAP (SEC, 2012, December 18).
Though actions taken by Ashman contributed to the revenue misrepresentation, the SEC asserted that the chief reason for these "errors" was due to a lack of internal controls at the acquired subsidiary, Promotions.com (Ryan, 2012) . For instance, the SEC claimed that "Alwine and Barnett had tampered with documents, backdated revenue contracts, and acquired an erroneous audit confirmation that pretended that the subsidiary earned revenue via completing work" (Ryan, 2012) . In conjunction with Ashman's approval, Promotions.com recorded $305,000 in erroneous profits by recognizing revenue prior to completing the actual work (Ryan, 2012) . In this case, the business improperly applied the percentage-of-completion method. According to the SEC, instead of TheStreet calculating a valid estimate for the percentage complete, the company booked revenue based on "the say so of management" (SEC, 2012, TheStreet Court Complaint, p. 6). In another instance, the co-presidents of the subsidiary engaged in "sham transactions" which created a revenue mirage of an additional $275,000 (Ryan, 2012) .
As a result of these "accounting errors," TheStreet overstated its 2008 income by 152% or $1.7 million (SEC, 2012, TheStreet Court Complaint, p. 6). Due to these accounting irregularities, the company restated its 2008 earnings in January 2010 (SEC, 2012, TheStreet Court Complaint, p. 6). With regard to the executives, Ashman, Barnett, and Alwine were forced to pay penalties of $159,240, $130,000, and $120,000, respectively. While TheStreet's CFO is banned from acting as an executive or board member for any U.S. public company for three years, the subsidiary's presidents each received harsher 10-year banishments (SEC, 2012, December 18). The SEC report provides insight into the purpose behind the revenue manipulations. For example, Diebold was accused of attempting to devise ways to "close the gap" between actual earnings performance and profit expectations. The company used an assortment of strategies to artificially bolster revenue and income. For instance, Diebold violated GAAP by recognizing a sale when inventory was shipped from the factory to the company's warehouse. In some instances, the corporation would recognize sales prematurely by shipping merchandise to their warehouses ahead of schedule. These "sales" were recorded under the "bill-and-hold basis" but allegedly the customers never requested for the seller to retain the merchandise (SEC, 2010, Diebold Court Complaint, p. 4). As can be observed by the other cases, misuse of "bill-and-hold accounting" appears to be a common theme (see Table 3 for a summary of the allegations and applicable penalties against each corporation). According to the SEC, recording revenue in this manner falsely boosted revenue by nearly $30 million in 2003 (SEC, 2010, Diebold Court Complaint, p. 10). After these "errors" were detected, the entity revised its bill-and-hold process to coincide with GAAP and was forced to reduce affected earnings by a cumulative total of approximately $56 million (SEC, 2010, Diebold Court Complaint, p. 10). Another strategy Diebold used to inflate earnings was through the use of a bogus earnings reserve, similar to Nortel. In connection with the bill-and-hold transactions, in 2003 Diebold developed a profit reserve. While it is not illegal under GAAP to create a reserve, the profits must be released when the revenue is actually earned by the company. Hence, an earnings reserve actually is created when revenue is temporarily deferred. However, according to the SEC, Diebold released profits when earnings were truly deteriorating. Thus, the company falsely boosted earnings in 2004 by $7.5 million (SEC, 2010, Diebold Court Complaint, p. 11).
In June 2010, the SEC forced Diebold to pay $25 million in civil penalties related to the revenue "miscalculations." In addition, four executives connected with the issue were charged (SEC, 2010, June 10). Also, the CEO, Walden O'Dell, though not entangled in the fraud, agreed to disgorge cash bonuses of $470,000 as well as shares of Diebold stock and stock options. These disbursements were deemed necessary since they were awarded
Multi-Sector -General Electric
The next case involves one of the most highly regarded blue-chip companies in the world. General Electric (GE), headquartered in Fairfield, Connecticut, was accused of manipulating its earnings through various revenue recognition techniques. The SEC was compelled to launch an investigation into the conglomerate's accounting practices as GE consistently met or exceeded Wall Street analysts' earnings expectations in each quarter between 1995 and 2004 (Leone & Reason, 2009) . Although it is possible that a business will consistently meet or surpass earnings forecasts, it is improbable that this could occur consecutively in each quarter for 10 years in a row. Although the trains were "sold" to the financial institution, GAAP does not allow for revenue recognition because the product not only remained with the seller, but the seller maintained continual support for the products. GE still stored the trains on their property and provided the necessary fuel and maintenance for the equipment. These "sales" were not limited to a few locomotives. In the fourth quarter of 2002, 191 trains were "sold." However, 68.6% of these of these transactions resulted from illegitimate sales that should have been recorded in the subsequent quarter (Henry, 2009) Yet, in an effort to counteract the loss resulting from the elimination of RAM, GE orchestrated a method where the spare parts were transferred to another GE business unit where the percentage of completion was used. This tactic created $1 billion in additional earnings (SEC, 2009, GE Court Complaint, p. 27). This "gain" from the interdepartmental transfers more than absorbed the "loss" from the elimination of RAM. Additionally, GE saved the difference, valued at $156 million, and established a "cookie jar" reserve. A cookie jar reserve indicates a hypothetical fund where profits are held and released at a future date. GE also violated GAAP by releasing the incremental profits in future periods when earnings were fundamentally weaker. These practices lead to GE 
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After a lengthy four-year investigation, GE settled the accounting fraud charges. In August 2009, the entity settled with the SEC to pay a $50 million civil penalty as a result of the above-mentioned issues, as well as "improper accounting for hedging transactions and interest rate derivative securities" (Henry, 2009 ). According to the Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement, Robert Khuzami, "GE bent the accounting rules beyond the breaking point" (SEC, 2009, August 4) . In addition, throughout the tenure of this investigation, the company incurred $200 million in legal and accounting costs. Nonetheless, these costs and penalties are relatively insignificant in comparison to the conglomerate's total revenue and earnings.
Impact on Stakeholder Wealth
Although the degree of losses and/or write-downs has been quantified, the impact on shareholder wealth must also be assessed. Typically, if an organization's revenue and profits continue to climb, the stock price will follow suit. However, those reported numbers must be trustworthy. As a corporation's integrity becomes impaired due to revenue and earnings restatements, there has been a significant impact on the common stock price as shown in Table 4 . While the information presented in Table 4 illustrates a short-term and intermediate-term view, it is also important to assess the long-term impact on shareholders. Although the market value of the previously-mentioned companies (except Nortel) has stabilized, none of the discussed companies' stocks are near their historical highs. In comparison to the all-time high (which is the highest market value ever recorded for a company's stock), HP, TheStreet, Diebold, and GE's stocks, as of May 2013, have declined by 67%, 95%, 46%, and 60% (Yahoo Finance). Nortel's stock, on the other hand, is now worthless as the business is defunct. Typically, when a security declines significantly from its maximum value, shareholders will demand organizational changes.
It appears that as the listed companies' stock prices deteriorated, there might have been greater incentive for management to boost profits. Although the chief goal of a corporation is to amplify shareholder wealth, the maximization should occur legitimately through organic earnings growth and not accounting tactics that violate GAAP.
In addition, shareholders can also be harmed due to the deteriorating financial position of a corporation. Lawsuits can create major contingent liabilities. For example, if the $1 billion lawsuit against HP materializes, the losses can multiply and negatively impact income and stockholder's wealth.
Conversely, revenue recognition scandals can also have negative ramifications on bondholders (creditors). For example, although it is possible that Autonomy's accounting issues are due to the differences between GAAP and IFRS, the credit markets decided to punish HP's bond prices first and ask questions later. On the wake of HP's announcement of the massive impairment loss, the company's bonds began to trade as if they were "junk" A junk bond typically carries a high interest rate due to increased risk. After the announcement, interest rates on the entity's corporate debt increased by nearly 0.25%. This resulted in HP's five-and ten-year bonds trading at nearly 2.94% and 3.35% beyond U.S. treasury bonds (Robinson, 2012) . Accordingly, one week later Moody's Investors Service downgraded the company's credit rating. Moody's is a credit ratings agency that rates the quality of an entity's long-term debts. Moody's downgraded HP's bonds to Baa1 from A3 as the company was rendered to carry greater risk (Hesseldahl, 2012, November 28) . This reduction in credit quality placed HP's corporate bonds on the lower end of the investment grade scale (Moody's, p. 6). Although Moody's didn't mention the case against Autonomy, it is likely that the massive impairment loss influenced the downgrade. As observed, when credit downgrades occur, interest rates can rise dramatically on outstanding debt issues. Higher interest rates will not only reduce the market price of a company's bonds (bondholder will suffer losses) but can increase interest expense for future debt issues. Increased expenses can result in reduced profitability and also harm shareholders.
In addition, as Nortel Inc. filed bankruptcy, bondholders are attempting to recover their investment. Although the equity has been completely eliminated, some bond issues are still trading in the market. As of May 2013, one of the company's bond issues, due in 2023, was trading at roughly half price (Church, 2013) . It is a reasonable assumption that the creditors will collect only the current fair value of the bond. Hence, creditors are significantly harmed in the Nortel case as well. Although the revenue recognition scandal didn't cause the bankruptcy, it was certainly a symptom of an underlying condition.
Trend in Reporting & Disclosure Enforcement Actions
While there are still a significant number of companies mishandling revenue recognition laws, there has been a noticeable decline in SEC enforcement actions with regard to reporting and disclosure (R&S) investigations. Why has the following trend occurred? According to Stephen Juris, a Forbes contributor, "corporate executives are less inclined to risk their financial security or liberty to cook their employers' books" (Juris, 2012) . It is also quite possible that the stringent requirements set forth by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SoX) have assisted in reducing overall financial reporting abuses. SoX, a law that was created as a result of massive financial accounting scandals occurring in the early 2000s (e.g. Enron, WorldCom, Tyco), significantly increases an executive's responsibility over the financial reporting process. In addition, management must conduct a thorough assessment of their corporation's internal controls over financial reporting (Cascini & DelFavero, 2008, p. 24) . Each quarter, executives need to sign off on the validity of the financial statements and are required to issue a report attesting to the effectiveness of internal controls (Juris, 2012) . If SoX is violated, executives may face severe penalties and jail-time.
According to Juris, it is plausible that the provisions of SoX have not only deterred management from engaging in fraudulent schemes, but the thorough assessment of internal controls has also allowed for deficiencies to be remedied prior to the development of significant GAAP compliance issues (Juris, 2012) . the rules? and 2) Has the SEC merely shifted its attention to other areas? It is highly plausible that SoX may have had a dampening effect on these types of regulation breaches, as Juris suggested. Nonetheless, oversight of the revenue recognition process should continue to strengthen regardless of the perceived trend.
Revenue Recognition's Future
The above-mentioned examples presented cases where companies circumvented the prescribed accounting regulations. With the exception of HP, only GAAP rules were breached. Since GAAP clearly isn't tamperproof, should there be an extensive modification to revenue recognition rules? There is a high possibility that a revision will take place in near future.
As part of the International Convergence Project, the IASB and the FASB have been working on a joint framework to remove the differences between GAAP and IFRS. With regard to revenue recognition, the agenda aims to "create a single revenue recognition standard across industries for both GAAP and IFRS" (Lamoreaux, 2012) . As of July 24, 2013, the FASB released proposed modifications to GAAP. The FASB & IASB proposed changes to sales with contracts by mandating that greater evidence must be provided in order to book a sale; procedures for "identifying separate performance obligations in a contract," constraints on revenue recognition from licenses, and "progress toward completion of a performance obligation" (FASB, 2013, August, Project Update).
Nonetheless, while a generalized approach might appear to be conceptually sound, in the opinion of the authors, this might not be practical. There are inherent differences in the two systems as U.S. GAAP is rendered to be more "rules-based," whereas IFRS is considered to be "principles-based." As observed in the HP case, some of the revenue recognition rules present under IFRS allowed for more flexibility and interpretation versus GAAP. According to Stice, Stice, and Skousen, authors of Intermediate Accounting: 17 th edition, because international rules aren't as detailed as GAAP, "GAAP is often referenced when detailed revenue recognition guidance is needed" (Stice, 2010, p. 424).
In addition, according to Paul Miller, CPA, an accounting professor at the University of Colorado, the proposed revenue recognition modifications appear to be less complex than current law (Lamoreaux, 2012) . "Simplification signals compromises have been made to make financial statements easier to prepare," stated Miller (Lamoreaux, 2012) . Hence, it is being suggested that IFRS might be deficient in areas with regard to revenue recognition. Although it appears, based on SEC enforcement actions, that cases of revenue recognition violations have decreased in recent years, it is possible that this trend could reverse in the future if less stringent revenue recognition rules are instituted due to the convergence between GAAP and IFRS.
CONCLUSION
Although revenue recognition errors can prove to be costly to shareholders, creditors, and the corporation as a whole, the penalties for cases involving fraud, in the opinion of the authors, should be more substantial. In all of the presented cases, the fines levied by the SEC equated to less than 1% of revenue, as shown in Table 5 . When the fine is infinitesimal to the overall revenue, there appears to be little deterrent to stopping revenue manipulation. However, if a minimum penalty of 2% of total revenue was implemented for all cases involving revenue recognition fraud, the monetary punishments would be much harsher. For instance, if General Electric paid a penalty of 2% of revenue, the fine would have been over $3.1 billion! A punishment of that magnitude might dissuade management from engaging in activities that could cause considerable losses, lawsuits, and significant long-term destruction to stakeholder wealth. 
